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Abstract
In this paper the sources of the Indonesian economic slowdown as well as US eco-
nomic fluctuations are investigated within a range of four-variable structural vector
autoregression models. Identification is attained either through the combination
of short-run and long-run restrictions or the more recent sign restrictions. The
results show that both economies are not affected by disturbances in the same way.
Indonesian economic output is lowered by falling contribution of oil price shocks,
negative aggregate supply shocks and tightening monetary policy. Meanwhile, the
US economy is mainly driven by aggregate supply shocks. The effect of oil price
disturbance to the US itself declines over time and the monetary policy shocks no
longer hurt the US economy.
Keywords: Economic fluctuations, oil price shocks, Structural Vector Autoregression
1 Introduction
During the period of the 1970s up until the 1990s the Indonesian economic growth was
generally higher relative to the period of the recent 2000s (see Figure 1). The higher
growth in the previous periods was associated with the enormous growth of oil sector
(Hill 1996; 2000). Similar to Indonesia, the US economic growth in the current 2000s
was also lower compared to the periods of the 1970s and 1990s. Peersman (2005) finds
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that the US economic slowdown in the early 2000s was partly explained by the oil price
shocks. Hamilton (2000) also shows that an oil price upturn dampens the US economy.
More precisely, a 3 per cent cumulative decline in the US real GDP from the late 1970s
to the beginning of the 1980s and 5 per cent during global financial crisis are contributed
by oil price shocks (Kilian & Vigfusson 2014). Updated studies on how oil price shocks
today affect the US economic fluctuations have not been conducted since those works.
Such study is even not found for Indonesia’s case. This paper will be the first attempt to
model the effect of oil price shocks on a small open economy like Indonesia. In particular,
comparing the US as a net importer of oil with the Indonesia as a net exporter of oil
can be beneficial so that the government can apply better policies to stimulate higher
economic growth.
Figure 1: Average annual growth rate
Source: Indonesia Bureau of Statistics (2015); US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015)
As presented in Figure 2, Indonesia is a net exporter of oil. In comparison, the US
is still a large importer of oil although its imported volume has started to reduce since
2007. Unlike the negative effects on the oil importer countries, the shocks in the oil price
lead to a positive growth on the economy of oil exporter countries (Abeysinghe 2001).
Additionally, the shock impacts are nonlinear implying that the positive effects for oil
exporter countries are higher compared to the negative effects for oil importer countries
(Hamilton 2003; 2011; Cunado & Gracia 2005).
The modelling framework used in this paper is a structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) model. Since Sims (1980), VARs have been very popular as a tool to analyze
macroeconomic data. Many studies have been conducted to investigate the factors lying
behind economic fluctuations using the VAR framework, especially on a large developed
economy of the US. Not only do oil price shocks have influences on the fluctuations
of the GDP growth, other shocks including aggregate supply, aggregate demand and
monetary policy shocks are also significant over the periods. For instance, Walsh (1993)
claims that the US recessions of 1990 1991 are because of negative shocks of aggregate
spending together with disruption in supply and demand for money. Likewise, using a
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Figure 2: Daily net exports of crude oil (barrel th)
Source: OPEC (2014)
four-variable SVAR model, Peersman (2005) identifies not only oil price increase, but
also negative aggregate supply shocks, negative aggregate demand shocks and restrictive
monetary policy as contributors of the US economic slowdown during early millennium.
For Indonesia, Siregar and Ward (2002) find that aggregate demand shocks significantly
explained Indonesian output fluctuation during 1984 1999.
Unlike Siregar and Ward (2002) who identify that aggregate demand shocks have a
permanent effect on the Indonesian output, Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1999)
reveal that such shocks only have a temporary effect on the US output. In contrast,
an aggregate supply shock has a permanent effect on the US output. Similar to the
aggregate demand shock impact on the US output, a monetary policy shock is also
believed that it affects the output just temporarily (Bernanke & Blinder 1992; Christiano
et al. 1998). Following oil price disturbances, a tightening monetary policy is found
having contribution to fluctuations of the US economy (Bernanke et al. 1997).
This paper extends the model of Peersman (2005) in several ways. First, the US
dataset is extended from 90 observations (1980q1 2002q2) to 140 observations (1980q1
2014q4). Second, a similar model is estimated for an oil exporting country of Indonesia
with a full set of shocks including oil price, aggregate supply, aggregate demand and mon-
etary policy shocks. This may give valuable lessons since many episodes have happened
during the last decade including the global financial crisis in 2008 2009. The oil price
drop since mid-2014 may also strengthen the output growth and lower the inflation rate
of the oil importing countries, but cause some losses in exports and revenues for the oil
exporting countries (Baffes et al. 2015).
The key findings of this paper are as follows. The strong Indonesian economic per-
formance during 1990s was because of the large aggregate supply shocks outweighing the
other shocks. Meanwhile, the positive contribution of oil price shocks to the Indonesian
output had been falling down since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and they
even became negative during 2013 2014. Another important finding is that the inflation
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targeting framework introduced in 2005 has allowed oil price shocks to influence the In-
donesian monetary policy behavior. For the US case, the effect of oil price disturbance
declines over time especially compared with the period before 2002 which is when the
Peersman sample period ends. The monetary policy shocks also no longer hurt the US
economy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model incorporat-
ing its technical aspects. The data and variables construction as well as the identification
strategies are also explained. Section 3 discusses the empirical results showing the im-
pacts of each shock to the Indonesia and US economies. This section presents impulse
response analysis and some robustness check using alternative identification strategy and
an alternative variable. This section also provides variance decompositions along with the
historical decompositions analysis. Section 4 draws the conclusions with possible policy
implications for Indonesia.
2 The Model
2.0.1 The Model Specification
The model used is an SVAR model following Peersman (2005) as follows:
Y t = c+
n∑
i=1
AiY t−i +Bεt (1)
where Y t consists of oil price (oilt), GDP (yt), consumer price index (pt) and nominal
interest rate (rt). All variables are expressed in percentage log return form except for
the interest rate which is in percent. c is a (n × 2) matrix containing deterministic
components which are a constant and a linear trend. Ai is autoregressive coefficients
of (n × n) matrix and εt is vector of structural disturbances. In sum, the full set of
constructed endogenous variables is
Y t = {100∆ln (oilt) , 100∆ln (yt) , 100∆ln (pt) , rt } . (2)
To capture the effects of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, a dummy variable
is added into the model specification for Indonesia, so that the equation (1) becomes:
Y t = c+
n∑
i=1
AiY t−i + κDt +Bεt (3)
where where Dt is the dummy variable for the crisis period and κ is a (n×1) matrix of
slope parameters. The dummy variable is constructed by defining 1 for 1997q4 to 1999q2
and 0 for the other periods.
As the data used is a quarterly data, the SVAR model is estimated using three lags.
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The Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE) and Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC) also suggest three lags to be used. LR still indicates three lags for the full data
sets used in model specification for the US. All models estimated satisfy the stability con-
dition. Under the model structure, four principal shocks identified are oil price, aggregate
supply, aggregate demand (spending) and monetary policy shocks, respectively:
ε
′
t =
[
εoil, εas, εad, εm
]
. (4)
To analyze further due to the importance of industrial sector, GDP is replaced by
industrial production on the other model specification for the Indonesian case as a ro-
bustness check. Also, to study the structural changes in the US economy over time,
estimation using different periods of data is presented.
2.1 Data and sample
The four endogenous variables chosen aim to provide a full set of shocks. Oil price is
used as a proxy for oil shocks. GDP and industrial production are proxies for aggregate
supply shocks, while CPI is determined as a proxy for aggregate demand shocks. Finally,
nominal interest rate is used as a proxy for monetary policy shocks. The data are collected
from various sources (see Appendix 1). All series of variables appear in a quarterly data
basis.
GDP and industrial production are already available in quarterly series, but oil price,
CPI and interest rate series are available in monthly base. So, the quarterly series for these
data are constructed by taking average over quarter. GDP and industrial production
series are seasonally adjusted. The sample period used for Indonesia is from 1992q1
2014q4 (92 observations), while the full set of the sample period for the US is from
1980q1 2014q4 (140 observations). Estimation using sample from 1980q1 2002q2 (90
observations) as used in Peersman (2005) is also presented to analyze the structural
changes in the US economy.
Unit roots tests of the raw data and constructed variables are performed using Aug-
mented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron tests in Eviews version 8. The results
show that all raw data are integrated processes of order one (I (1)) at 1 per cent signifi-
cance level. After constructions, all are I (0) except for the interest rate as it is still kept
in its level. It is therefore still I (1). However, the interest rate can be treated as I (0)
as the nominal interest rate cannot have a unit root if inflation and real interest rate are
stationary (Gali 1992; Gerlach & Smets 1995; Peersman 2005). The presence of the unit
roots can also be looked at through the data plots (see Appendix 2).
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2.2 Identification
Without constraints or structural identification, a VAR model is less meaningful. This
identification part is therefore crucial in the VAR model. After the additional structure
is imposed on the model, impulse responses, variance decompositions as well as historical
decompositions as information of dynamic properties are then able to be interpreted.
The structure now makes the model become an SVAR model. Common identification
strategies used in SVAR are short run restriction, long run restriction, combined short
run and long run restriction and sign restriction (Martin et al. 2013). The first three
restrictions are recognized as traditional parametric restrictions, while the latest is a non-
parametric restriction since it is directly imposed onto the impulse response functions
rather than on the structural parameters.
Adopting Peersman (2005) procedures, two different identification strategies are used
in identifying the four shocks in this paper. First is based on traditional restriction
combining short run and long run restrictions. Such strategy is also applied in Gali
(1992) with a four-variable IS-LM model and Gerlach and Smets (1995) with a monetary
model. As an alternative, the second strategy i.e. sign restriction where zero restrictions
are released is used. Both strategies including the estimation techniques are discussed in
detail respectively in the next subsections.
2.2.1 Traditional restriction
The first identification chosen which combines short run and long run restrictions is mo-
tivated as follows. In his influential work, Sims (1980) models the US economy using
recursive short run restriction with four endogenous variables including interest rate,
money supply, prices and output. Extending the Sims model and Leeper et al. (2004),
Kim and Roubini (2000) argue that the structural restriction does not have to be recur-
sive. However, one limitation of the non-recursive structure is that there are difficulties
to find strong instruments identifying the causality of variables (Kilian 2011).
In modelling the oil price, one example using recursive short run restriction is Kilian
(2009). He disentangles the oil price shocks into three parts i.e. oil supply, global demand
and oil-specific demand shocks. The latest is reflected by the oil price itself. Among those
three, oil-specific demand and global demand are the most dominant shocks. This result
underlines that exogenous assumption of oil price shocks may be too stringent. This
assumption is released in the second identification strategy used in this paper.
Beside the strong contemporaneous assumptions, the short run restrictions either
recursive or non-recursive also offer less theoretical assumptions. So, long run restriction
is the next alternative identification strategy which is better justified by theory (Martin
et al. 2013). One advantage of this long run restriction is that the short run dynamics
remain unrestricted.
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To get the best features of both short run and long run restrictions, the combination
of both is used in this paper. It makes the imposed restrictions more plausible compared
to single short run restriction. Under this strategy, the oil price is assumed not to be con-
temporaneously affected by the shocks of non-oil variables. This assumption is motivated
by the fact that Indonesia is a small oil exporter and the US is an oil importer country. In
the VAR literature, Sims (1992) also uses such exogenous oil price assumption. Following
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), a monetary policy shock is assumed not to have immediate
effect on output. Relying on the vertical long run Philips curve, aggregate demand and
monetary shocks are assumed not to have long run effects on output (Blanchard & Quah
1989; Gali 1992; 1999). Shocks in the aggregate demand are also known as aggregate
spending or IS shocks (Peersman 2005).
As a result of the combination of both restrictions, the system forms a just identified
model. Let S is the matrix of short run restriction and F is the matrix of long run
restriction. Since the model has four endogenous variables and three lags, Φ which is an
(4× 4) inverse matrix of autoregressive parameters, is specified as
Φ =
[
I4 − Φ̂1 − Φ̂2 − Φ̂3
]−1
(5)
The matrices of short run and long run restrictions are then respectively as follows:
S=

s11 0 0 0
s21 s22 s23 0
s31 s32 s33 s34
s41 s42 s43 s44
F=

f11 f12 f13 f14
f21 f22 0 0
f31 f32 f33 f34
f41 f42 f43 f44
 (6)
As F = ΦS, f23and f24 which are restricted to be zero in the long run, can be derived as
f23 = Φ21s13 + Φ22s23 + Φ23s33 + Φ24s43 = 0 (7)
f24 = Φ21s14 + Φ22s24 + Φ23s34 + Φ24s44 = 0 (8)
At which Φij is an element of Φ given in equation (5). Once all restrictions are set, the
matrix S becomes
S=

s11 0 0 0
s21 s22 s23 0
s31 s32 s33 −Φ24Φ23 s44
s41 s42 −Φ22Φ24 s23 − Φ23Φ24 s33 s44
 (9)
Because of the non-recursive structure, ordinary least squares (OLS) method will be
inconsistent as simultaneity bias will arise due to the existence of endogenous variables
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in each equation (Martin et al. 2013). Therefore, maximum likelihood method is needed
to estimate the parameters of the SVAR in S matrix. The parameters of the S matrix in
equation (6) are estimated using maximum likelihood as follows:
lnLt = −N
2
ln(2pi)− 1
2
ln|Ω| − 1
2
e′tΩ
−1e′t (10)
where N = 4 is the number of endogenous variables, eˆt is the estimated residuals and Ω
is the variance-covariance matrix of the SVAR. The log likelihood for T observations is
lnL =
T∑
t=1
ln Lt, (11)
which is maximized with respect to the parameters in S matrix computed based on
MATLAB version R2014a.
2.2.2 Sign restriction
The zero contemporaneous restrictions imposed in the traditional strategy are found
too stringent, for instance the exogenous assumption of oil price. Kilian (2009) argues
that this assumption is inappropriate since the oil price shock is closely connected to
its precautionary demand or market concerns about oil supply and its global demand.
Also, assumption of no contemporaneous impact of monetary policy on output is not
consistent with most general equilibrium models (Canova & Pina 1999). Similarly, long
run restriction can also be misleading. Permanent impacts of nominal and money shocks
on output are accepted based on some growth models, such as OLG model (Gali 1992).
So, to check the robustness of the results using traditional identification strategy, sign
restrictions are used as an alternative. Instead of imposing parametric restrictions, this
latter strategy imposes more explicit restrictions directly onto impulse response functions.
This identification strategy which is also known as a non-parametric restriction is a
representation of generalization approach of the previous traditional restrictions (Martin
et al. 2013). In the previous methods, the ordering of variables is chosen with the
purpose of obtaining impulse responses consistent with the theory. In this sign restriction
approach, models with signs consistent are directly selected, so that the zero restrictions
imposed in traditional approach are no longer needed. To study the economic fluctuations,
this strategy is used by Peersman (2005), Ruffer et al. (2007) and Sanchez (2007).
Meanwhile, Faust (1998), Canova and de Nicolo (2002), Uhlig (2005), Scholl and Uhlig
(2008) and Rafiq and Mallick (2008) use this strategy to study a monetary shock. Kilian
and Murphy (2009; 2012) also use this strategy to study the oil market dynamics. Even
though this sign restriction method solves the structural identification problem, the model
identification problem is still unresolved (Fry & Pagan 2011).
The sign conditions applied in this paper are based on theoretical framework and the
8
characteristics of each economy of Indonesia and the US. For example, an oil price shock
is expected to have positive effect on the Indonesian output, but negative effect on the
US output. This is because Indonesia is a net exporter of oil while the US is a net oil
importer referring to Figure 2 in Section 1.
Other sign conditions following Peersman (2005) are as follows. First, after an ex-
pansion of the economy, it is expected that output will increase and prices and nominal
interest rates will decrease. It is because when supply of goods escalates, prices in the
goods market tend to fall, so that interest rates are likely to be lower. Second, follow-
ing a positive demand shock, responses of all variables are expected to be non-negative.
These are consistent with IS curve shift. On the contrary, after a tightening of monetary
policy, it is expected that there will be a negative response of oil price, output and prices.
All sign conditions are imposed as ≤ or ≥ implying that zero responses are allowed.
Additionally, since an oil price shock can be considered as a supply shock, there is no
restriction imposed on oil price response due to an aggregate supply shock. The response
will be determined by the data. As a consequence, the responses of output, prices and
interest rates due to either oil price shock or aggregate supply shock will be the same.
So, to separate between the two shocks, it is assumed that the shock with the greatest
impact on oil price is the oil price shock. All the sign conditions are summarized in Table
1 and 2.
Shocks oil price output CPI r
Aggregate demand ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Monetary policy ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≥ 0
Aggregate supply ? ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Oil price ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Table 1: Sign restriction for Indonesia
Shocks oil price output CPI r
Aggregate demand ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Monetary policy ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≥ 0
Aggregate supply ? ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Oil price ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0
Table 2: Sign restriction for the US
Technically, the B matrices in equations (1) and (3) are estimated to generate new set
of uncorrelated shocks by incorporating Givens rotation matrix Q. Since the shocks εt are
orthogonal, variance covariance matrices in equations (1) and (3) are Ω= BB
′
. Infinite
number of appropriate decompositions of Ω can be found by setting up Ω = BQQ′B′
where B is the Cholesky decomposition of Ω.
Q = Πm,nQm,n(θ) (12)
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with Qm,n(θ) as six bivariate rotation matrices since there are four endogenous variables
within the model. Q1,2, for instance, has the form:
Q1,2=

cos(θ) −sin(θ) 0 0
sin(θ) cos(θ) 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 (13)
The Q matrix is then formed by:
Q=Q1,2×Q1,3×Q1,4×Q2,3×Q2,4×Q3,4 (14)
where this Q matrix is an orthonormal matrix with the properties QQ′ = Q′Q = In.
θ = θ1, . . . , θ6 and rows m and n are rotated by the angle θi. Each θi is drawn from
a uniform distribution [0, pi]. Finally, impulse response functions are computed. If they
satisfy the sign conditions, they are retained, but if not, another Q matrix is drawn. To
correct the problems of identification for the shocks magnitude, a normalization of the
structural equations is needed (Ouliaris et al. 2015). This step is used in this paper
following Peersman (2005).
3 Empirical results/discussion
3.1 Dynamic inter relationships: Impulse responses based on
traditional restriction
The responses of each variable due to structural shocks based on traditional short run and
long run restrictions are displayed in Figure 3 (Indonesia) and Figure 4 (US). The impulse
responses of oil price, output and price are accumulated to look into the effects on levels
of these variables. While the impulse responses of interest rate are not accumulated since
this variable is already in level. All of impulse responses are reported for 40 quarters or
10 years.
Oil price shocks
The responses of all four variables due to an unanticipated oil price shock are shown
in the first columns of Figure 3 and Figure 4. This shock is signified by a positive shock
to oil price. Following this shock, there are permanent effects on the output and price
levels, but only a short-lived effect on the interest rates. The magnitudes of the oil price
shock are very close in both countries accounted for over 12 per cent. It shows that
both countries are price takers in the oil market. However, given that Indonesia is a net
exporter of oil, this shock affects Indonesian GDP positively. As the economy expands,
prices in the goods market fall. Interest rate rises in short term as a consequence of
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Figure 3: Impulse responses for Indonesia based on traditional restriction ± one standard
deviation
inflationary reduction. Unlike Indonesia, US GDP is permanently hurt by the oil price
shock as the US is a large importer of oil. Its response is still positive up to three quarters
but it suddenly sinks afterwards. There is evidence that the effect of oil price shock to
the US economy is recently not as huge as in the past. This issue is discussed further
in Section 3.2. (iii). Following the contraction of the US economy, prices in the goods
market shoot up and a temporary increase in interest rate follows to compensate the
inflationary tensions.
Aggregate supply shocks
The responses due to an unanticipated aggregate supply shock are displayed in the
second columns of Figure 3 and Figure 4. Aside from the insignificant effect on oil price
in both Indonesia and the US, this shock is indicated by permanent effects on output and
prices as well as temporary effect on interest rates. The effect of aggregate supply shock
on the prices of goods market is found somewhat stronger in Indonesia than in US. As
a result, the decline in the interest rate lasts longer in Indonesia than in the US, for at
11
Figure 4: Impulse responses for the US based on traditional restriction ± one standard
deviation
least up to 8 quarters and 4 quarters, respectively.
Aggregate demand shocks
The third columns of Figure 3 and Figure 4 display impulse responses of each variable
as a result of an aggregate demand shock represented by permanent increase in price.
The effect on oil price due to this shock is not significant in both countries. In contrast,
this aggregate demand shock is noteworthy in influencing the economy of both countries
to expand in the short run. In the long run, the output growth returns to the base line
because the neutrality of nominal shocks holds. The effect on output is somehow a lot
stronger in US than in Indonesia. It lives for 10 quarters in the US but only 2 quarters
in Indonesia.
Money shocks
An unanticipated money shock is characterized by an increase in the interest rate as
depicted in the last columns of Figure 3 and Figure 4. The magnitude itself is twice
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larger in Indonesia than in the US. It is accounted for 100 basis points in Indonesia and
50 basis points in the US. The output of both countries reacts in a different way after this
shock. The Indonesian economy contracts for just two quarters before the effects become
insignificant. Unlike Indonesia, after a tightening of monetary policy the US economy
still expands for at least three quarters before the effects fade away. Since the interest
rate in the US is now almost zero per cent, a tightening monetary policy no longer hurts
the economy. There is only a temporary decrease in inflation for three quarters before
the effect dissipates. Nevertheless, there is evidence of price puzzle for Indonesia. This
finding is discussed further in Section 3.2. (ii). In addition, the money shocks do not
have significant impacts on the oil price in Indonesia, but the impacts are significant in
the US.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis
The robustness of the previous results is discussed in this section by applying sign re-
striction as an alternative identification strategy. Zero restrictions in the traditional
identification are released. Instead, restrictions are imposed directly into the impulse
response function. The results are discussed in Section (i) which presents the median
impulse responses with their 5th and 95th percentiles. Section (ii) evaluates the resulted
responses of the Indonesian economy emphasizing the role of industrial sector. Also, the
structural changes in the US economy are analyzed further in Section (iii) by comparing
impulse responses using different time periods within the model.
3.2.1 Impulse responses based on sign restriction
Oil price shocks
The median responses together with their 5th and 95th percentiles give very similar
results to the previous results based on traditional restrictions. After an unanticipated oil
price shock, there are permanent effects on the output and price levels, but only a short-
lived effect on the interest rates. As before, the Indonesian economy is positively affected
but the US economy is negatively affected. These are depicted in the first columns of
Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Aggregate supply shocks
Similar to the previous results based on traditional restrictions, the aggregate supply
shock is characterized by permanent effects on higher output, lower prices and temporary
lower interest rates (second columns of Figure 5 and Figure 6). However, the response of
oil price due to aggregate supply shocks is different using this sign restriction, especially
for the US. Given that the 5th percentile of the impulse response is below zero, it can be
considered that the aggregate supply shock in Indonesia is insignificant to influence oil
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Figure 5: Impulse responses for Indonesia: sign restriction with 90 per cent confidence
intervals
price. But for the US case, the aggregate supply shock seems have some effect on the oil
price. Considering the enormous increase in the crude oil production in the US in the last
several years and the large demands for crude oil, the US should now have an influence
on the oil price. The US is not a price taker anymore in the oil market. Therefore, the
short run zero restriction for oil price imposed in the traditional identification strategy is
probably too strict.
Aggregate demand shocks
As shown in the third columns of Figure 5 and Figure 6, assumptions that demand
shocks do not have long run effect on output level still holds for the US economy. Yet,
it is no longer held for the Indonesian economy. There is evidence that an aggregate
demand shock has a permanent effect on the level of the Indonesian GDP. This result is
consistent with Siregar and Ward (2002).
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Figure 6: Impulse responses for the US: sign restriction with 90 per cent confidence
intervals
Money shocks
Again, there is evidence that the neutrality of monetary policy does not hold in both
countries showing that a tightening of monetary policy has permanent effects on outputs
(last columns of Figure 5 and Figure 6). It is perhaps inaccurate for US economy since
its interest rate is now almost zero. But it is probably true for the Indonesian economy.
How tightening monetary policy affects Indonesian output is discussed in more detail in
Section 3.4.
3.2.2 Role of industrial sector to the Indonesian economy and explaining
puzzle: Traditional restriction
The composition of the Indonesian economy is dominated by the industrial sector and
accounts for 45 per cent of the total GDP (Figure 7).
An unanticipated positive shock in oil price is instantaneously followed by a substantial
increase of industrial production (see first column of Figure 8). The expansion of the
economy in fact stems from this sector through the exports channel. Aggregate supply
15
Figure 7: Share of Indonesia GDP (2013)
Source: Indonesia Bureau of Statistics (2014)
and aggregate demand shocks in industrial production are also found a lot larger (see
second and third columns of Figure 8) and as a result, the overall economy is escalated.
Apart from dissipating effect of aggregate demand shock onto the output in the long run,
oil price and aggregate supply shocks have permanent effects on the industrial production.
Figure 8: Impulse responses for Indonesia: industrial production as a proxy for output
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When GDP is used as a proxy for output, following a tightening of monetary policy,
goods prices immediately and permanently shoots up (see last column of Figure 8). Com-
mon VAR papers label it as a price puzzle. The absence of output gap (Giordani 2004)
and omitted variable which captures expected inflation (Castelnuovo & Surico 2010) are
found as the reasons why a price puzzle shows up. This puzzle is gone when industrial
production is used as a proxy for output. It is because the industrial production captures
the information of output gap.
In addition, the price puzzle actually explains the structure of Indonesian economy.
The Indonesian GDP is mainly shaped by consumption accounted for more than 60 per
cent and most of the consumption is for foods and beverages. Since both have relatively
low price elasticity, they are less sensitive to the monetary policy.
3.2.3 Structural change in the US economy: Traditional restriction
Overall there is a structural change in the US economy since Peersman’s work in 2005.
The magnitude of the oil price shock remains almost the same through time (see first
column of Figure 9). However the responses of other variables are now different. The
output contraction due to an unexpected oil price shock is now a lot smaller than a decade
ago. Consistent with this finding, EIA (2015) reports that the US production of crude
oil keeps shooting up in recent years and its growth in 2014 was the largest since 1940.
As a result, the US imports of crude oil also drop remarkably in the last ten years (EIA
2015). Both channels explain the finding of lower effect of the oil price shock. Although
the instant effect of the oil price shock on prices is now greater in the short term, it is
lower in the long term.
There is also evidence that the response of interest rate to an unanticipated oil price
shock is smaller than before and it dies out a lot more quickly. Higher interest rate is
expected to hold back the demand for oil. As the demand is now not only met by mostly
imported crude oil but also from domestic production, this oil demand is then more
rapidly influenced. Accordingly, the response of interest rate to oil shock now dissipates
faster. Moreover, as shown in the last column of Figure 9, a tightening monetary policy no
longer hurts the US economy since the monetary policy rate is now very low approaching
zero.
3.3 Dynamic inter relationships: Variance decompositions
(traditional restriction)
Table 3 and Table 4 present more statistical information on the resulted dynamic prop-
erties of the SVAR model for Indonesia and the US, respectively. Consistent with the
results of impulse responses, oil price is truly exogenous for both countries at which it is
dominantly controlled by oil shock itself both in the short run and long run. However,
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Figure 9: Impulse responses for the US: Comparing between periods
there is evidence that in the long run the US monetary policy has some contribution to
the oil price.
Comparing the contributions to output of both countries, the Indonesian economy
is mainly determined by the aggregate supply shock with slight influence of aggregate
demand shock in the short run. Oil price shock has an important involvement in the long
run. Unlike Indonesia, the US economy is almost equally shaped by aggregate supply
and aggregate demand shock in the short run. As the effect of aggregate demand shock
quickly dissipates, aggregate supply shock merely influences the US economy in the long
run. There is no role of oil price shock in the long run since the US is now less dependent
on crude oil.
The above result also underlines that the role of aggregate spending in the short run
in the US (>41 per cent) is a lot stronger than in Indonesia (<7 per cent). It is because
private spending in Indonesia is mostly for staple and foods. Also, it shows that the
government spending in Indonesia is not efficiently utilized.
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Quarter Oil price
oil price shock supply shock demand shock money shock
1 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 98.834 0.023 0.659 0.483
8 98.586 0.391 0.412 0.612
40 98.286 0.833 0.162 0.719
Quarter Output
oil price shock supply shock demand shock money shock
1 1.560 92.040 6.400 0.000
4 7.638 85.193 3.764 3.405
8 10.749 85.267 1.975 2.010
40 13.492 85.653 0.420 0.435
Quarter Price
oil price shock supply shock demand shock money shock
1 3.418 5.081 21.980 69.520
4 3.480 6.012 10.362 80.146
8 2.158 5.497 8.344 84.001
40 0.695 4.998 6.017 88.289
Quarter Interest rate
oil price shock supply shock demand shock money shock
1 0.540 28.545 70.896 0.019
4 6.651 39.965 38.997 14.387
8 6.697 39.899 37.492 15.912
40 6.643 39.909 37.178 16.270
Table 3: Variance decomposition resulting from different shocks for Indonesia: Percentage
of total
Money shock is the main determinant of prices in the goods market for Indonesia both
in the short run and long run. Aggregate demand shock itself only has significant role in
the short run (just over 21 per cent). It indicates that the monetary policy in Indonesia is
effective in controlling inflation. It is in line with the inflation targeting monetary policy
in Indonesia. Surprisingly, prices in the goods market in the US are primarily influenced
by oil price shock in both short run and long run. Money shock and aggregate demand
shock are the next important contributors. The latter becomes stronger in the long run,
but money shock tapers off due to the neutrality of monetary policy.
Aside from the aggregate demand shock being the main factor affecting the interest
rate (just over 70 per cent) in Indonesia, aggregate supply shock is the other substantial
determinant in the short run. Again, it shows that the Indonesian monetary policy
follows the inflation targeting rule. In the long run, aggregate supply and aggregate
demand shock are equally shared together with some contribution of money shock itself.
Similar to Indonesia, the US interest rate is predominantly influenced by the aggregate
demand shock in the short run. However, money shock has a stronger impact in the US
interest rate compared with interest rate in Indonesia. There is also some short run effect
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Quarter Oil price
oil price shock supply shock demand shock money shock
1 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 95.550 0.290 0.362 3.798
8 92.673 0.808 0.239 6.280
40 86.997 1.476 0.082 11.445
Quarter Output
oil price shock supply shock demand shock money shock
1 3.247 54.917 41.836 0.000
4 1.030 67.445 28.518 3.007
8 1.282 83.571 13.162 1.986
40 3.717 93.526 2.380 0.377
Quarter Price
oil price shock supply shock demand shock money shock
1 47.498 8.271 17.916 26.315
4 59.526 9.597 24.855 6.022
8 58.225 7.764 31.531 2.480
40 56.265 4.229 38.867 0.640
Quarter Interest rate
oil price shock supply shock demand shock money shock
1 3.410 10.084 44.626 41.880
4 4.597 3.626 51.530 40.247
8 4.340 4.553 51.865 39.242
40 4.108 6.423 50.115 39.355
Table 4: Variance decomposition resulting from different shocks for the US: Percentage
of total
from aggregate supply shock (>10 per cent), but it quickly vanishes in the long run. At
the same time, the role of aggregate demand shock gets stronger.
3.4 Dynamic inter relationships: Historical decompositions
(traditional restriction)
In order to investigate the contribution of each shock to the economic fluctuations in
both countries over time, the shocks are decomposed for each time period. In particular,
this section highlights the sources of the Indonesian economic slowdown and the role of
oil price shock to both Indonesian and the US’s economies. With the purpose of having
analysis in detail, time periods are divided into three parts. The first period is during
the 1990s up to the Asian financial crisis. The second period is after the crisis up to
the global financial crisis starting in 2008 and finally, the last period is after the global
financial crisis up to recently. In addition, the shocks decomposition to prices, oil prices
and interest rates are presented in the last two sections.
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Figure 10: Contribution to the Indonesian GDP 1993q1 - 2014q4
3.4.1 Decomposing the shocks to Indonesian output
Prior to the Asian financial crisis
Before the Asian financial crisis hit the Indonesian economy in the late 1990s, positive
aggregate supply shocks were so dominant to the Indonesian economy (see Figure 10).
Although there were some negative oil price shocks between 1993 and 1994, the positive
aggregate supply shocks outweighed all other shocks. The source of the positive shocks
stems from the industrial sector. Foreign investments were allowed to enter the Indonesian
economy especially flowing into the industrial sector starting in the early 1990s. At
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the same time, there were considerable government policy supports for industrial sector
particularly for heavy industries, such as credit easing and introduction of tariff barriers.
Starting in 1997q4, the Asian financial crisis forced the industrial sector to go bust.
After the Asian financial crisis
The positive aggregate supply shocks never bounce back to their levels as before the
Asian financial crisis. They were even negative for most of the time between 2000 and
2007. This negative trend was driven by falling commodity prices in the global markets.
It partly explains why the Indonesian economy slowed down during this time. On the
other hand, the contribution of oil price shocks fluctuates depending on the variation
of the world’s oil prices. The Indonesian economy gains when the prices go up and it
eases off when prices go down. For instance, there was a positive oil shock contributed
to the GDP when oil prices rocketed in 2008 (see Figure 10). However, oil price shocks
are a double-edged sword for Indonesia. On one side, Indonesia gains through exports
and generated revenues for government’s budget. But on the other side, the shocks also
act as a burden through the existence of fuel subsidy, for example during the late 2005.
Indonesia experienced a ‘mini crisis’ at that time. Initiated by an oil price increase, the
government was pushed to raise the subsidized fuel price. It then resulted in rising goods
prices. As a result, the central bank was forced to raise the interest rates (see Figure 10
from 2005q3 to 2006q2).
Posterior to the global financial crisis and afterwards
When the global financial crisis knocked many countries in 2008 particularly the US
and the Euro area, the world demand for crude oil crashed down. As a result, the oil price
fell sharply at that time implying that negative oil price shocks appeared. Also, Indonesia
was withdrawn from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in
2009. Combined with the plummeting oil price, such an event gives Indonesia a large hit
of negative oil shock to the economy. This finding provides a conflicting result with some
other previous studies (for example Barnes 1995 & Hill 2000) at which they claim that
the OPEC membership is not too significant influencing Indonesian economy. However,
whether the negative oil shocks comes from decrease in oil price or from withdrawal of
OPEC membership remains unclear.
At the same time, as the world economy contracted, negative supply shocks followed
contributed to the Indonesian GDP. Nevertheless, the GDP growth of Indonesia was
still positive in 2008-2009 even though negative oil price shocks and negative aggregate
supply shocks were persistent. This is because of positive aggregate spending shocks
and loosening monetary policy. The government provided a considerable fiscal stimulus
package in 2009. Together with private spending, it fueled the economy to still grow.
Despite the fact that the monetary policy effect was only short lived and aggregate
spending shocks lasted for two quarters only, they were found enough to keep the GDP
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growth still positive at that time. This result is consistent with the findings in Section
3.3.
After the global financial crisis period, the contribution of oil price shocks was stag-
nant and they have even become negative recently. It is because of falling oil production
over time and dropping oil prices in recent times. Additionally, the aggregate supply
shocks between 2009 and 2014 were mostly negative. This is because the factories and
machineries used in the industrial sector are getting old. As a consequence, the produc-
tion capacity falls indicating that the cost of production balloons. There was also some
evidence of restrictive monetary policy between 2009 and 2014. All these parts explain
the recent slowdown of the Indonesian economy.
3.4.2 Decomposing the shocks to US output
1990s
Before 1996, negative supply shocks dominated the US economy although there was
loosening of the monetary policy. From this time up to late 1999, the economy grew due
to positive aggregate supply shocks. Peersman (2005) describes this phenomenon as the
US ‘new economy’1. It is also strengthened by rebounding oil price shocks from some
negative shocks prior to 1998 to remarkable positive shocks thereafter until late 1999 as
the oil prices declined during this period. Between 1996 and 1999, aggregate demand
shocks mostly made a positive contribution to the US output. However, these shocks
suddenly fell in 1999q2 remaining until beginning 2000.
New millennium era
The millennium era started with negative aggregate supply and aggregate demand
shocks. The former shock became more persistent onwards. There was also a negative
aggregate demand shock in late 2001. This period (1999 - 2001) was recognized as the US
recession period since the last recession in the early 1990s. It was marked with dot-com
bubble up to 9/11 attack. At the same time, up until 2002 negative oil price shocks
appeared prominently. To counteract the whole effects, the central bank implemented
restrictive monetary policy during the periods of time. All these jointly negative shocks
explain why the US economy slowed down during the early millennium2.
After 2003, the economy recovered as the aggregate supply shocks were positive and
the inflation rate was kept low. Romer (2012) marks this period as a stability period.
Unfortunately, this stability period drastically ended in 2008.
Global financial crisis 2008 and afterwards
Initiated with properties and real estate bubble, the financial market collapsed in
1 It is associated with technological acceleration, i.e. remarkable declines in semiconductors and com-
puters’ prices (Jorgensen & Stiroh 2000)
2 These findings are consistent with Peersman (2005)
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Figure 11: Contribution to the US GDP 1993q1 - 2014q4
late 2008. The US real GDP recorded its utmost falloff for two consecutive quarters
since 1957-1958 (Romer 2012). Between 2008q3 and 2010q1 negative aggregate supply
shocks appeared continually, whilst negative aggregate demand and oil price shocks just
lasted for three quarters (see Figure 11). Negative money shocks were there within the
same periods in response to the two latter negative shocks. Starting in 2009q1 money
socks became positive followed by positive growing demand shocks since the next quarter.
These positive shocks were attributed to the government’s actions, such as the bailouts,
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and large reduction in the federal budget deficit.
In turn, the US economy had fully recovered in 2010.
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3.4.3 Decomposing the shocks to prices and oil prices
Before the Asian financial crisis, prices in the goods market of Indonesia were around 0.3
per cent lower than the baseline. It was because of the strong aggregate spending shocks
as well as positive aggregate supply shocks. Oil price shocks also showed its contribution
to some extent. These results are in line with the results in Section 3.4 (i), for example
when Indonesia suffered from ‘mini crisis’ in 2005. Prices went up by more than 70 per
cent relative to the base line due to oil price shocks together with aggregate supply shocks
(see Figure 12).
Figure 12: Decomposition of CPI
In the US, during the ‘new economy’ period from 1996 to just before the dot-com
bubble, prices in the goods market were about 50 per cent below the baseline. It was
attributed to the oil price shocks and positive aggregate supply shocks. In the last few
years, goods prices were on average lower than the baseline as a result of lower impact of
oil price shocks compared to the 1990s - early 2000s period. Also, these oil price effects
were canceled out by aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks.
The shocks contribution to the oil price as shown in Figure 13 indicates that oil price
was not truly exogenous throughout the period of time. For Indonesia, aggregate supply
and aggregate demand shocks explained some parts of the oil price decline before the
Asian financial crisis. However, the oil price fluctuations were completely explained by
the oil price shocks itself afterwards. Unlike Indonesia, despite the fact that aggregate
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Figure 13: Decomposition of oil price
supply and aggregate demand shocks in the US had nothing to do with the oil price
fluctuations over the time periods, US monetary policy had some role to the fluctuations.
For instance, the sharp plummeting oil price in 2008 was around 30 per cent explained
by the US monetary policy.
3.4.4 Decomposing the shocks to interest rates
Starting in 2005 Indonesia implemented inflation targeting framework for its monetary
policy altering from money base targeting. If the time periods as presented in Figure
14 are divided into two parts i.e. before and after 2005, the monetary policy framework
shows a number of significances. From 1995 to 2002, the interest rates were always
higher than the baseline. These were almost totally explained by the aggregate supply
and aggregate demand shocks. Next, the interest rates were below the baseline from 2003
to 2014. Emphasizing the periods since 2005, the interest rates no longer responded only
to aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks. They also responded substantially to
oil price shocks. In other words, the inflation targeting framework had allowed oil price
shocks to influence the Indonesian monetary policy behavior.
Similar to Indonesia, between 1995 and 2001, interests rate in the US are found
significantly higher than the baseline. Nonetheless, aside from the period 2004 - 2008, they
were lower than the baseline for all over periods of time. This behavior was dominantly
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Figure 14: Decomposition of interest rates
influenced by the aggregate demand shocks and money shocks itself. These results are
consistent with the findings in Section 3.3.
4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper investigated the sources of the Indonesian economic slowdown as well as US
economic fluctuations within a range of four-variable structural vector autoregression
models. Identifications are attained either through a combination of short-run and long-
run restrictions or by using the more recent sign restrictions technique. The identified
structural shocks were oil price, aggregate supply, aggregate demand (spending) and
monetary policy shocks. Impulse responses, variance decompositions as well as historical
decompositions were used to analyze the dynamic inter relationships between variables.
The results highlight that the sources of the Indonesian economic slowdown were because
of falling contribution of oil, negative supply shocks and tightening monetary policy.
In terms of international oil price shocks, Indonesia is still a price taker in oil market,
but the US is no longer a price taker due to its vast increase in the crude oil production
as well as considerable decrease in imports of oil in the last decade. Overall, the oil price
shocks still benefit Indonesia, but hurt the US economy although is not as large as in the
past. Also, the US dependence on oil now falls.
To stimulate higher economic growth, Indonesia needs new investment in fixed capi-
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tal, such as machineries and factories to escalate the production of the industrial sector.
Additionally, Indonesia needs new investments in oil refineries to boost up the oil produc-
tion. The results also underline the role of government spending together with private
spending in driving economic growth, at least in the short term.
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Appendix 1: Data source
No. Data descrip-
tion
Units Frequency Source Original
source
1 Oil price (crude
oil price)
USD/BarrelMonthly CEIC Directorate
General of Oil
and Gas
2 GDP Index
2010=1.00
Quarterly FRED OECD
3 Industrial pro-
duction
Index
1993=100
Quarterly CEIC Central
Bureau of
Statistics
4 CPI
(all commodi-
ties)
Index
2010=100
Monthly FRED OECD
5 Interest rate
(policy rate:
reference rate
(BI rate))
per cent
per an-
num
Monthly CEIC Bank of In-
donesia
Table 5: Indonesia (1992Q1 2014Q4)
No. Data descrip-
tion
Units Frequency Source Original
source
1 Oil price
(crude oil
price, refiner
acquisition:
composite)
USD/BarrelMonthly CEIC Energy In-
formation
Administra-
tion
2 GDP Index
2009=100
Quarterly CEIC Bureau of
Economic
Analysis
3 CPI
(all commodi-
ties)
Index
1982-
1984=100
Monthly CEIC Bureau of La-
bor Statistics
4 Interest rate
policy rate
(Fed Funds
Rate)
per cent
per an-
num
Monthly FRED Federal Re-
serve Board
Table 6: US (1980Q1 2014Q4)
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Appendix 2: Data plots
Figure 15: Data plots (Indonesia: 1992Q1 2014Q4)
Figure 16: Data plots (US : 1980Q1 2014Q4)
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